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Abstract 
Despite a substantial growth in the sub-Saharan African region, a trend of divestment by multinational oil 
marketing companies has been witnessed in Kenya in the recent past. These companies have often cited 
stringent operating markets and pricing laws in the country which bites on their profits. The implications of 
price regulation whether economic or social could depend on a variety of factors, thus an empirical study was 
carried out to estimate the relationship between price regulation, market concentration, product differentiation 
and number of firms entering and exiting the industry within the study period. This explored the implications of 
price regulation on market structure of oil marketing firms in Kenya. An analytic study approach was used and 
secondary data was obtained from Petroleum Institute of East Africa for 63 companies registered as at 
December 2014. Data was analyzed using an entry and price competition model to analyze data using OLS 
estimates for a period spanning from 2004 to 2014. The obtained results were used to make inferences and 
conclusions. The findings of this study showed that opportunity costs for price regulation is significant, price 
regulation significantly affected the market concentration by of these companies an indicator of reduced 
competition in the industry after the implementation of the policy. The number of firms entering and exiting the 
market also intensified. Therefore, as long as the policy is still in place, the regulator should always be aware of 
hidden costs of price regulation and should put in place structures and mechanisms to ensure that competitive 
markets are natured to attract investors into the country. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Regulation consists of all mechanisms of social control or influence affecting all aspects of behavior from 
whatever source whether they are intentional or not [3]. Well-regulated, competitive markets can maximize 
consumer welfare leading to economic growth. 
The Energy Act enacted in 2006 laid the foundations of regulations of petroleum sector in Kenya by putting 
together all laws relating to energy policies under one regulatory body known as Energy Regulatory 
Commission (ERC). Its functions include regulation of the economic and technical aspects of electricity, 
renewable energy and petroleum subsectors [61]. Petroleum industry in Kenya covers transportation, refining 
and marketing of oil products. Since their operations and investment impact on the whole economy directly and 
indirectly, the government saw the need to have a controlling hand in the sector [29] data shows that Kenya’s oil 
industry contributes over 20% of the Gross National Product. With the transport sector being the largest 
consumer of petroleum products of approximately 60% of the total volume followed by manufacturing 16%, 
commercial establishment 11%, households’ use 9% and agriculture 4% [29]. However, according to [14] latest 
data, the total consumption of petroleum products reduced by 5.7 % from 3,857.90 thousand in 2012 to 3,638.00 
thousand in 2013. At the same time, annual average oil prices of crude oil increased from $110.60 per barrel in 
2011 to $112.97 in 2012, a slowing trend in the sector. 
Kenya heavily depends on imported petroleum products to meet its energy needs and is therefore viewed as an 
important source of energy [60]. Since 2005, petroleum pump prices have been surging at a relatively higher 
rate than crude oil, implying a cartel-like pricing approach by the major oil companies. In a study conducted 
from July 2003 and May 2004, the Monopolies Prices Commission investigated the pricing of some petroleum 
products and found no explicit coordination among oil companies [21]. Given that the market structure of the 
petroleum industry could facilitate cartelization, we assume the oil companies behave like a cartel [32] spurring 
enactment of Price regulation in December 2010 to control the petroleum sector. 
Price controls expose weaknesses in less diversified players. Smaller players, particularly independents, have 
also found it difficult to operate in the Kenyan market under price controls due to thinner margins in the retail 
end compared to wholesale. Both listed downstream oil marketers are relatively well diversified with segments 
such as Fuel Oil, LPG, Aviation and Commercial businesses hence increasingly accounting for a higher share of 
profits [28]. 
The pricing mechanism in the industry has been contested by various industry players arguing that it does not 
favor new investments and entrants of new players. Oilibya’s Managing Director Ridah Elamir said “the basis of 
profit margins is unknown and it will have ramification on the industry”. The industry players warned that 
controlled fuel prices could see exit of multinationals firms; citing regulations to negatively impact on the 
business climate in the country which so far has been witnessed. 
179 
 
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR) (2015) Volume 24, No 6, pp 178-205 
 
1.1.1 Price Regulation and its Legislative Framework in Kenya 
Kenya’s energy sector is governed by the Energy Act No. 12 of 2006 which is a comprehensive legislation 
covering petroleum sector, natural gas, renewable energy and electricity sectors. Energy Act 2007 was formed 
basically for the purpose of regulation of importation, exportation, transportation, refining, storage and sale of 
petroleum products. Its role involves protection of consumers and investors and other stakeholders’ interests as 
well as create a fair competitive business environment in the sector. 
1.1.2 A Market Structure 
Market Structure is the manner in which a market is organized, based largely on the number of firms in the 
industry [69]. The four basic market structure models are: perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic 
competition, and oligopoly [69]. 
It is the selling environment in which a firm produces and sells its product characterized by the number of firms 
in the market, ease of entry and exit of firms and the degree of product differentiation. Most industries are 
characterized by having multiple firms often drastically varying sizes with some having or all having market 
power that is the ability to raise price above their competition and still have a positive demand [35]. Government 
can affect markets either through direct participation or through indirect participation in private markets. [35] 
Market concentration is a concept derived to arrive at a single number that accounts for not only the number of 
firms but also how sales are distributed among firms in the market. If one counts the number of firms in an 
industry even after the exit of a large number, the market may still appear competitive [35]. Therefore, market 
concentration refers to the extent to which a small number of firms or enterprises account for a large proportion 
of economic activity such as total sales, assets or employment [27]. 
1.1.3 Petroleum Sector in Kenya 
Petroleum sector in Kenya is composed of the following key players: the regulatory authority, the transporter 
(Kenya Pipeline Corporation), oil marketers and the refinery. Petroleum is the most important source of 
commercial energy and in Kenya; it is imported in two forms: crude for processing at the refinery and as 
finished products. So far, the sector has undergone changes from 1994 with the deregulation of retail prices and 
the importation of crude and refined products. Government requires all oil marketers to process their crude oil at 
the refinery KPRL, which is 50% owned by the government and 50% Essar, an Indian company. Importation of 
the product is done through an open tender system where one winner gets to import on behalf of the whole 
industry then shared among the OMC according to market share volumes [30]. 
The industry structure of processing and delivery entails processing of crude oil to petroleum products by KPRL 
in Mombasa which is then piped by KPC to various storage facilities including Mombasa, Nairobi, Nakuru, 
Eldoret and Kisumu. Final redistribution to most parts of the roads is mostly by road transport. The OMCs do 
the final dispensing of petroleum and other products. Even though the industry is open to all players, foreign 
companies are by far the largest players [46], this is despite the liberalization of the sector. 
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1.2: Statement of the Problem 
Reference [14] stated that a good investment climate is pivotal to achieving the goals of Kenya’s Vision 2030 
and thus, an enabling environment is key in addressing regional disparities in resource endowments, 
development and access to other socio-economic services. 
Despite a substantial and well publicized growth in oil demand across Africa, a trend of divestment in 
downstream operations by oil companies has been experienced over the last three to five years in Kenya [30]. 
The same report states that there is an increase in non-traditional and mid-size players to take up markets left 
and governments as well, taking leading roles in the industry. Reference [71] stated that Kenyan government 
needs to improve the market environment for private sector by investing in infrastructure, increasing domestic 
energy production and removing bottlenecks of doing business. 
With a weakened global economy, volatile oil prices and globally reducing margins in downstream business, 
multinationals are reconsolidating their balance sheets to maintain shareholder value by shedding assets that are 
marginal and where costs and operating risks are high [30]. Reference [72] report shows that regional growth 
reflected an increase in demand of 4.9% for West and Central Africa and 4.4% for East and Southern Africa. 
For Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the growth rate comes out at 4.6% per year compared with an overall global 
growth rate of around 1% per year [71]. The prospects look good but why would oil multinationals exit the 
market? And what are the implications of their exit on the market structure? 
The outgoing companies have previously cited stringent pricing laws which bite bitterly on their profit margins 
subject to high operational costs and interest in the industry. Reference [62] indicated that reduced profits, 
increased competition and official price caps are forcing big oil firms out of Kenya. Shell recently exited Kenya 
by selling their shareholding to Vivo Energy. 
Despite most multinationals leaving the sector, it is still dominated by foreign companies since local firms 
cannot raise capital for acquisition and this only strengthens those already in the market and controlling a bigger 
market share [62]. There are more than 50 licensed oil marketing companies but just six of them control 86% of 
the market [49]. 
This study was therefore important to policy makers as it sought to highlight the implications of price 
regulations on market concentration, entry and exit of firms and product differentiation in a homogeneous 
Petroleum Products market. When prices are held below natural levels, resources such as talent and investor 
capital leave an industry to seek a better return, meaning less discovery and innovations are available in the 
sector [26]. Hence, it is virtually important to remind policy makers of the effects of price controls on 
innovation and other product improvements. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
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This section provides the reviewed literature in support of the study. Theoretical literature is first presented to 
explain the need and effects of price regulations in the economy. It also presents the empirical literature review 
section on the studies that have been done before, followed by a conceptual framework showing relationship of 
variables and finally the theoretical model adopted for the study. 
2.2 Theoretical Literature 
Reference [69] gave a distinction of two types of economic regulations: structural and conduct regulations. 
Structural regulation concerns the regulation of the market structure and it includes entry and exit while Conduct 
regulation regulates the behavior of producers and consumers in the market and includes control of prices, 
products, advertising rules and quality standards. 
Reference [59] Produced predictions along the lines of Capture Theory and tried to answer the question: why is 
there regulation of markets? The theory attempts to explain who receives benefits or burdens of regulation, their 
forms and effects upon allocation of resources. In Reference [59] approach, regulation is acquired by the 
industry and for its benefit. The basic resource of the state is the power to coerce and any group that can control 
this power benefits. Self-interested groups will seek to get the state’s coercive power to support their interest 
that is, agents are rational enough in the sense of choosing actions that are maximizing utility. Stigler states that: 
“We assume that political systems are rationally devised and rationally employed which is to say that, they are 
appropriate instruments of desire of members of the society”. 
The efficient structure hypothesis by [35], states that firms earn high profits because they are more efficient than 
others. There are two distinct approaches within the efficient hypothesis: the X-efficiency and Scale–efficiency 
hypothesis. In X-Efficiency hypothesis, firms become more profitable because of their lower costs. Such firms 
tend to gain larger market shares, which may manifest in higher levels of market concentration, but without any 
causal relationship from concentration to profitability [2]. The Scale-efficiency approach emphasizes economies 
of scale rather than differences in management. Larger firms through economies of scale acquire profits and 
lower costs enabling them acquire larger market shares, leading to high concentration and profits. 
2.3 Conceptual framework 
Reference [3] Cited by [69] identified three broad causation channels of performance in a market; namely 
Structural-Conduct-Performance Paradigm. The below framework adopts a similar format of [3] to show a 
causal relationship between Independent variables, Intervening Variables (Price Regulation, Licensing Controls, 
Product Mix Controls, Distribution Controls, Public sector influences, Capacity utilization, role of foreign trade) 
and dependent variables (Market concentration, Entry and Exit, Product differentiation) of the oil marketing 
companies in Kenya. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
2.4 Theoretical Model 
To describe the mechanism that drives the long-run impact of the price regulation on market structure of oil 
marketing firms in Kenya the study adopted an entry and price competition model. The study thus adopts [8] 
regression model to show the relationship of independent and dependent variables. This helped analyze the 
effect of the policy on market structure as the industry evolves from a liberal market to a controlled market.  
Reference [8] Considered two types of long-run distortions affecting the equilibrium market structure. First, the 
floor binds in all oligopoly markets and induces excessive crowding, relative to the unconstrained situation. In 
the second case, the price floor distorts the market by blocking the entry of the most efficient firm. This model 
applied well in this study because it considered the effects of price regulation, a ceiling control mechanism but 
with the same expected distortions. 
Reference [8] estimated the below linear regression model: 
tjyeartmarketjtyFZjtFPolicyjtYj ,,,, εµµβ ++++=  
Where Yj,t is the variable of interest and labels measures of competition, spatial differentiation, station capacity. 
This was given by four outcomes (number of pumps, number of islands, large convenience-store indicator, and 
self-service indicator). 
The term Policyj,t is a policy indicator, a binary equals to one when regulation occurs and Zero when it doesn’t . 
µ year t and µmarketm are year and market fixed effects.Zj,t are control variables that measured: (i) FSA-level 
demographic characteristics (average income, population size and unemployment rate), (ii) characteristics of the 
regional upstream markets (rack prices and number of companies at nearest terminal) and (iii) provincial taxes 
Fluctuations in 
Petroleum Retail/rack 
 
Market structure Taxes, Demographic Characteristics 
Research and design, 
Advertising  
 
 
 
 
Price Regulation 
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on gasoline and ɛj,t, is the error term.  
The objective of this empirical analysis is to test the predictions of traditional oligopoly theories and reviewed 
literature; by studying the impact of Kenya’s price regulatory policy on long-run market structure of oil 
marketing firms. Market structure at time t may depend on pricing behavior of firms in a market over a number 
of periods [75]. As the literature reviewed revealed that price regulation in the form of price ceilings, is likely to 
influence market structure of an industry, the effect of price controls on Kenyan oil marketing industry was thus 
estimated and examined. 
2.5 Empirical Literature 
Price caps were introduced to protect the consumer but evidence has also shown that this may lower the profits 
of the supplier. When pricing as a marketing strategy is controlled, firms have to look for other competitive 
strategies [46]. In such an environment, industry attractiveness and margins are reduced and it is important to 
understand the level of competition by firms. Policymakers need to be mindful of the fact that intervention to 
prevent or reduce the negative consequences could also reduce or eliminate the beneficial impacts [6]. 
2.3.1 Effects of regulation on Market concentration 
Reference [11] formulated an alternative explanation on market structure-performance relationship and proposes 
the X-Efficiency Hypothesis. Applied to the Petroleum sector, this hypothesis stipulates that a firm which 
operates more efficiently than its competitors, gains higher profits resulting from low operational costs. Since 
efficiency determines market structure and performance, the positive relationship between these two seems 
superficial. 
In his study Reference [42], found out that price regulation have attracted previous resistance from oil marketers 
who opt for markets controlled by forces of demand and supply. In the last 4-5 years, most multinationals have 
restructured and relocate their business to regions with the highest market growth, high returns on investment 
and low political and business risks. 
Reference [13] present a one time-period model of Cournot competition with uncertain demand. They show that 
price cap regulation in the presence of uncertainty might fail to increase production and therefore fail to increase 
consumer welfare. These models solve the optimal entry problem of firms under uncertainty using real options 
type of arguments. Reference [12] studied the impact of price control in a perfectly competitive market and 
concluded that such regulatory interventions are detrimental as they introduce a disincentive for competition. 
A recent study by [55] found that prices tend to fall after the adoption of sales-below-cost laws in US gasoline 
markets. By use of a monthly panel of state-level prices for thirty states, over a twenty year period they argue 
informally that such regulations could affect competition of stations. 
Reference [36] also illustrated this relation by using the example of financial analysts that communicate their 
opinion to the market and thus influence the strategy process of firms. The focus on the strategy formation 
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process in the banking industry and second the role of the regulator in moderating this process both on an 
industry level as well as on a club or sub-population level.  
Reference [73] found that, in the short run, asymmetric access price regulation is an effective instrument to 
make the entrant and consumers better off. Thus, price regulation would stir competition in the short run. [5] 
Argued that price-cap regulation leads to more efficient capital replacement decisions compared to rate-of-return 
regulation and showed that ﬁnite price cap horizons distort capital replacement. 
Price regulation is adopted to protect consumer welfare by putting a maximum price that can be charged which 
in turn bites on the supplier profits [70] as referenced by [46]. It is with this that the oil marketers have to adjust 
their operations to fit into the market ensuring that they remain profitable as possible. 
Reference [52] in his study concludes that when government adopts a price control, it defines the market price 
of a product and forces all, or a large percentage of transactions to take place at that price instead of the 
equilibrium set through supply and demand. As supply and demand shifts constantly in responses to taste and 
costs, the government’s price will change only after a lengthy political process as it is never at an equilibrium, it 
will either be too high or low resulting in dead weight loses because of failure to rate consumer or producer 
surplus. 
2.4.2 Effects of Price Regulation on Entry and Exit of firms 
Reference [8] studied the effects of price regulations on the organization and performance of gasoline market in 
Quebec and other parts of Canada. The goal of the research was to demonstrate that price regulations can have 
important unintended consequences on prices and productivity in the longer run by distorting the structure of 
markets. They argued in particular that price control policies crowded markets hence creating an endogenous 
barrier to entry for low-cost retailers. 
Reference [25] studied the effects of bans on self-service gasoline stations in New Jersey and Oregon on prices 
and market structure. The study found out that the bans led to higher prices, but did not seem to achieve their 
objective of protecting smaller stations. Reference [6] analyzed the potential impact of a specific type of 
minimum gasoline price regulation in California, aimed at smoothing the evolution of gas prices, without 
addressing the potential effects of the regulation on the entry and exit of gas stations. Reference [10] points out 
that although price cap regulation appears to be successful in its main aim of establishing incentives within the 
regulatory period for cost efficiency, there remain questions as regards to its efficiency to induce appropriate 
entry and exit in a market in the long term. 
Entry and exit can be defined as either gross or net of exits [47] as referenced by [4]. They used the net measure 
of entry and exit which gives a measure of expansion of the industry to measure for competition barriers. This 
understates entry by the amount of exit. 
2.4.2 Effects of Regulation on Product Differention 
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Reference [69] states that if a product is unique, consumers may be willing to buy it even if the price exceeds 
the prices of competitors, however, in the oil sector where products are rather homogenous, technological 
opportunities may be relevant. 
Reference [17] used a dynamic equilibrium model of Pharmaceutical industry to access the impact of the 
introduction or removal of price controls across countries on the introduction of new drugs, consumer welfare 
and value in different scenarios. Its predictions showed that price controls failed to compensate retail marketers 
resulting in a significant decrease in the number of new drugs and in large welfare losses at a global scale. 
However, abandoning price controls especially hurts domestic consumers and this may explain why many 
countries still use them, despite their inefficiency. 
Reference [21] introduced a joint framework of both strands in theory and showed how the co-evolution of 
transaction costs and capabilities determine the boundaries of the firm thus the market structure. The study 
depicts that the drivers, nested in transaction cost economics and capability based view triggered the evolution 
of financial intermediation systems towards vertical disintegration and the emergence of intermediate market 
between distinct modules of production [4]. 
Reference [34] did a study on telecommunication competition and found out that imposing price controls in the 
U.S. reduces firm’s value, R&D, the flow of new drugs, and the net present value of consumer welfare and 
when price controls are removed, there is an increase in firms value, R&D, the flow of new drugs, and consumer 
welfare globally. Reference [74] highlighted that price controls encourage firms to locate their development 
activities elsewhere and that the resulting losses of jobs, businesses, and tax revenues make it slightly privately 
optimal for European Union countries to abandon price controls. 
Reference [54] studied the impact of PCR on productivity growth in the US telecommunications industry 
between 1988 and 1998. The authors identify a “pronounced positive effect of PCR on growth.” They find that 
24 of the 25 firms in the sample “experienced an increase in mean technological change” and that 23 of the 25 
firms “experienced an increase in annual productivity growth following the implementation of regulation”. In 
her study of exchange markets in the US between 1991 and 2002, reference [15] corroborates earlier findings 
that price cap regulation is associated with higher earnings for regulated suppliers. 
2.6 Critique and Gaps in the existing Literature 
Most of the literature about price regulation analyzed the post regulation period only, considering that the pre-
period lacks details of the long run effects of price regulation. It is also notable that most research works deal 
with the productivity and strategic movements adopted by industry players these are the results and reactions of 
industry players but no study has been done to establish the effects of prices on the industry structure.  
Thus, this research aims at closing the gap on the effects of price regulations on market structure of oil 
marketing firms in Kenya. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
An analytical approach was used for this study, since it identifies the different variables involved in a study 
[41].This study aimed to establish the effects of price regulations on oil marketing companies’ market structure 
measured by analyzing the effect brought about by the policy changes on the market concentration, entry and 
exit from the market and product differentiation (technological change).The study analyzed pre and post period 
implementation of the policy. Therefore two regression models of the same variables at different time periods 
were adopted and results compared. 
The study used entry and price competition model to estimate the effect of the policy on the changes in the 
structure of markets; this eliminates part of the endogenous selection problem by controlling for time-invariant 
market structure characteristics that might have led to the regulation [8]. 
3.2 Population 
The petroleum sector has 63 oil importing and marketing companies [49]. The researcher targeted all the 63 of 
the companies in existence as at December 2014. Data was analyzed for a period of Eleven years starting 
January 2004 to December 2014. 
3.3 Sample and Sampling technique 
Since the population is relatively small as indicated by [49] above, the researcher used census as the sampling 
technique since it is more accurate [33]. 
3.4 Dat Collection Instruments 
The study used secondary sources of data. Data for the annual market shares, annual sales was collected from 
quarterly published journals of Petroleum Institute of East Africa. Other published Data from ERC statistics and 
Industry reports were assessed as well. The researcher obtained data from various oil markets so as to enrich and 
compare the above sources as well. 
3.5 Data Collection Procedure 
Data was collected directly by the researcher from company websites and published journals.  
3.6 Data Analysis and Presentation 
After collecting data, the researcher analyzed the relationship between price regulation and market structure of 
oil marketing firms in Kenya using an empirical model discussed in 3.10.  A linear regression of OLS because 
of its BLUE estimates. Data was tested to ensure it fits in the assumptions of OLS.  
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The study used two main econometric specifications the full panel from 2004 to 2014, long difference between 
2010 and 2014.This was to measures differential evolution of markets after the implementation of the policy in 
2010. These two periods approximate the pre and post implementation of the policy. The output was tested and 
evaluated on economic, statistical and economic criterion. Statistical test include estimation of coefficients, t-
ratios, R2 and F-Statistics. Economic criterion evaluated includes test for Stationarity, Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Tables and Figures presentations were appropriately used to present the data that was analyzed 
using Eviews as a statistical software. 
3.7 Empirical model 
The study adopted [8] linear regression model of entry and price competition to estimate the effect of the policy 
in the structure of markets. The study period covers an eleven year period, between 2004 and 2014 and during 
this period, the market underwent major changes that satisfy the two conditions required for the policy to 
possibly distort markets. However, it remains an empirical question whether or not these changes were 
important enough and the price control policy implemented affected market concentration, entry/exit and 
product differentiation decisions.  
Thus the study considered two main econometric specifications. The short panel to cover the period before 
regulation i.e. 2004 to 2010 and the long panel to measure the (potentially) differential evolution of markets in 
Kenya after the implementation of the policy in 2010 i.e. 2011 to 2014. These two periods approximated the 
pre-policy and post-policy industry specifications. 
In this specification, the study controlled for trends in other relevant variables before and around the time of the 
implementation of the policy, which could be confounded with the policy implementation. 
The study adopted the below regression model  
).....(,.........,,,, itjtyZjtsPolicyjtYj εβ ++=  
 
).......(..........,,,, iitjtyZjtlPolicyjtYj εβ ++=  
Yj,t is the variable of interest 
Where j indexes a market 
Zj,tγ Control variables include, licensing controls, quality controls, rack prices, subsidies and taxes, import 
duties geographical coverage and time dummies 
The term Policyj,t  is a policy indicator whereby the impact of regulation is measured by creating dummy 
variables which take the value of 1 when the regulatory measure takes place and 0 when otherwise. 
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βs and βl in equation (i) and (ii) for the short and long panel specifications respectively. ɛj,t, is the error term 
The analysis focused on measures of market concentration, measure of Product differentiation and measure of 
entry and exit of firms. The outcome variables in this study differ based on the unit of analysis: (i) HHI as 
measures of concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), (ii) No of firms as a measure of entry and exit of 
firms, Entry and exit can be defined as either gross or net of exits [4]. (iii) Investment on R&D as measure of 
product differentiation. Market concentration was measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index given by the below 
formula 
).(....................
1
2 iiiSiH
N
i
∑
=
=
 
Where H is the sum of the squares of the market shares of firms. It is ranked from 0 to 1.0, 1 being an indication 
of a highly concentrated market and, Si is the market share of firm i in the market, and N is the number of firms. 
The purpose of the model was to investigate whether price regulation can lead to a market structure in which the 
technological progress is present, there is free entry and exit and competition is enhanced and according to 
reviewed theory and literature theory, price regulation policy can distort the post reorganization equilibrium 
structure of retail markets in the following ways: concentrated markets, blockaded entry and slow differentiation 
of products. This in summary gives the below testable implications. 
H1. The concentration of markets subjected to price regulation is low 
H2. The number of competitors is higher in markets subjected to price regulation. 
H3. The fraction of firms with the newer technology is smaller in markets subjected to price regulation 
The study only incorporated market concentration and number of firms. Product differentiation was not 
considered because of lack of data. The predictions of the model was tested in the following section of the 
paper. 
4. Research Findings and Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presented the empirical findings, interpretations and discussion of the analyzed data. The study 
sought to answer the following research questions. 
- How has price regulation affected the level of market concentration of oil firms in Kenya? 
- Does Price regulation affect entry and exit of firms in the sector? This is given by the net number of firms at 
a certain period of time as per the reviewed literature.Before data was analyzed the following test were 
carried out; First diagnostic tests were conducted to test if the data fit into OLS assumptions this include 
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Stationarity and Heteroskedasticity tests. Stationarity determined whether estimates have unit roots. 
Statistical evaluations criteria were evaluated to statistically test the reliability of the estimates using 
measurers like correlation coefficients. The last criteria was the economic criteria which reviewed whether 
our parameters satisfy economic theory as far as size and magnitude are concerned. As indicated in chapter 
3, the econometric analysis was based on two different specifications, first period from 2004 to 2010 and 
2011 to 2014 corresponding to the time prior to regulation and the regulation period. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents summary statistic for the two time periods and discussions. From the table 4.1 below mean 
variable of price z can be observed to have marginally increased from 89.04 before price regulation to 111.49 
after price regulation showing a relative increase in prices, mean variable of number of firms increased from 49 
to 59 and mean HHI increased from 1297.68 to 1652.03 an indicator of higher concentration in the market. At 
10 % significance level the difference of means are statistically significant see table 4.2.The rise in prices is 
reinforced by a lower standard deviation after regulation. This can be argued that retail oil prices after oil price 
regulation and control regime have been high compared to period under no price control, under the relevant 
sample size and space. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics before price regulation 
 H N Z 
 Mean  1297.676  49.00000  89.04429 
 Median  1467.420  45.00000  94.03000 
 Maximum  1537.240  67.00000  97.17000 
 Minimum  808.6300  39.00000  75.83000 
 Std. Dev.  335.4387  10.31181  8.861247 
 Skewness -0.921987  0.934836 -0.708366 
 Kurtosis  1.888738  2.270885  1.763284 
    
 Jarque-Bera  1.351918  1.174624  1.031508 
 Probability  0.508668  0.555819  0.597050 
    
 Observations 7 7 7 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistic after price regulation 
 H N Z 
 Mean  1652.030  59.75000  111.4875 
 Median  1224.675  60.00000  111.2650 
 Maximum  1620.370  63.00000  116.6200 
 Minimum  1098.400  56.00000  106.8000 
 Std. Dev.  233.1909  3.774917  4.028874 
 Skewness  0.781802 -0.034882  0.188322 
 Kurtosis  2.005972  1.046373  1.985208 
    
 Jarque-Bera  0.572158  0.636921  0.195277 
 Probability  0.751203  0.727268  0.906977 
    
 Observations 4 4 4 
 
4.3 Diagnostic Tests 
4.3.1 Stationarity Tests 
Data was analyzed to test for unit roots (i.e.) stochastic trends using standard Philips-Peron (1988).This 
eliminated issues of autocorrelation as well. The results presented in table 1 (a),(b) and (c) showed that the null 
hypothesis of a unit root test was rejected at 5% level of significance for no of firms and market concentration. 
Null hypothesis was rejected at 5% level of significance for prices. 
Table 4.3: Unit root tests HHI 
PP Test Statistic -4.888477     1%   Critical Value* -8.6833 
      5%   Critical Value -4.7037 
      10% Critical Value -3.5442 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 1    ( Newey-West suggests: 1 ) 
Residual variance with no correction 2576.051 
Residual variance with correction 897.2618 
     
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
191 
 
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR) (2015) Volume 24, No 6, pp 178-205 
 
Dependent Variable: D(H) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/24/15   Time: 14:59 
Sample(adjusted): 2004 2014 
Included observations: 11 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
H(-1) -0.710705 0.235491 -3.017974 0.0037 
C 795.9278 318.8096 2.496562 0.0025 
R-squared 0.901070     Mean dependent var -153.9600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.802140     S.D. dependent var 197.6328 
S.E. of regression 87.90991     Akaike info criterion 12.02522 
Sum squared resid 7728.152     Schwarz criterion 11.42430 
Log likelihood -16.03783     F-statistic 9.108167 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.955073     Prob(F-statistic) 0.203695 
 
Table 4.4: Unit Root Test for net entry and exit of firms 
PP Test Statistic -5.383681     1%   Critical Value* -8.6833 
      5%   Critical Value -4.7037 
      10% Critical Value -3.5442 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 1    ( Newey-West suggests: 1 ) 
Residual variance with no correction 5.023256 
Residual variance with correction 2.161168 
     
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(N) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/24/15   Time: 15:01 
Sample(adjusted): 2004 2014 
Included observations: 11 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
N(-1) -0.441860 0.725045 -0.609425 0.0516 
C 28.25581 42.59495 0.663361 0.0271 
192 
 
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR) (2015) Volume 24, No 6, pp 178-205 
 
R-squared 0.270818     Mean dependent var 2.333333 
Adjusted R-squared -0.458365     S.D. dependent var 3.214550 
S.E. of regression 3.881980     Akaike info criterion 5.785289 
Sum squared resid 15.06977     Schwarz criterion 5.184364 
Log likelihood -6.677933     F-statistic 0.371399 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.709302     Prob(F-statistic) 0.651565 
 
Table 4.5: Unit root test on prices 
PP Test Statistic -4.364774     1%   Critical Value* -4.3347 
      5%   Critical Value -2.0720 
      10% Critical Value -1.6759 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 1    ( Newey-West suggests: 1 ) 
Residual variance with no correction 3.168339 
Residual variance with correction 1.132676 
     
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(Z) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/24/15   Time: 15:04 
Sample(adjusted): 2004 2014 
Included observations: 11 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Z(-1) -0.029146 0.011131 -2.618508 0.0001 
R-squared 0.044421     Mean dependent var -3.273333 
Adjusted R-squared 0.044421     S.D. dependent var 2.230120 
S.E. of regression 2.180025     Akaike info criterion 4.657751 
Sum squared resid 9.505017     Schwarz criterion 4.357289 
Log likelihood -5.986627     Durbin-Watson stat 2.944564 
4.4 Heteroskedasticity 
To ensure that there is constant variance the researcher tested for Heteroskedasticity using White test and the 
results were as shown below. 
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Table 4.6: Heteroskedasticity test of HHI 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 0.075426     Probability 0.002159 
Obs*R-squared 0.524316     Probability 0.009389 
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/24/15   Time: 15:46 
Sample: 2011 2014 
Included observations: 4 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -26.10987 9861585. -0.264763 0.0052 
Z 47.67127 176501.9 0.270089 0.0021 
Z^2 -216.4677 789.1603 -0.274301 0.0096 
R-squared 0.131079     Mean dependent var 10550.61 
Adjusted R-squared -1.606763     S.D. dependent var 11597.81 
S.E. of regression 18725.22     Akaike info criterion 22.62684 
Sum squared resid 3.51E+08     Schwarz criterion 22.16656 
Log likelihood -42.25367     F-statistic 0.075426 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.141930     Prob(F-statistic) 0.932159 
 
Table 4.7: Heteroskedasticity test of entry and exit 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 45.56918     Probability 0.004179 
Obs*R-squared 3.956587     Probability 0.038305 
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/24/15   Time: 15:47 
Sample: 2011 2014 
Included observations: 4 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
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C -3828.494 403.7536 -9.482253 0.0469 
Z 68.69295 7.226354 9.505894 0.0467 
Z^2 -0.307531 0.032310 -9.518191 0.0466 
R-squared 0.989147     Mean dependent var 3.718835 
Adjusted R-squared 0.967440     S.D. dependent var 4.248701 
S.E. of regression 0.766649     Akaike info criterion 2.420130 
Sum squared resid 0.587751     Schwarz criterion 1.959851 
Log likelihood -1.840261     F-statistic 45.56918 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.141930     Prob(F-statistic) 0.104179 
 
We reject the null hypothesis in both tests since p-value is less than 0.05: 
4.5 Regression Results 
Table 4.7 presents the regression results for the variables at the two time periods .From the results, research 
questions will be answered and the general and specific objectives achieved. 
This section presents an econometric analysis  of the change  in market structure before  and  after  the  
implementation of the  policy,  controlling for observed and unobserved variables that  might  be correlated with  
it.  This section directly tests predictions H1 and H2. 
Table 4.8(a): Regression results on effect of price regulation on no of firms before regulation, from equation (i) 
Dependent Variable: N 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/24/15   Time: 15:56 
Sample: 2004 2010 
Included observations: 7 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 71.66127 45.41029 1.578085 0.0004 
Z -0.254494 0.507823 -0.501147 0.0075 
R-squared 0.047827     Mean dependent var 49.00000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.142607     S.D. dependent var 10.31181 
S.E. of regression 11.02258     Akaike info criterion 7.872725 
Sum squared resid 607.4861     Schwarz criterion 7.857271 
Log likelihood -25.55454     F-statistic 0.251149 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.192354     Prob(F-statistic) 0.037547 
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Table 4.8(b): Regression results on effect of price regulation on no of firms after regulation, from equation (ii) 
Dependent Variable: N 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/24/15   Time: 15:54 
Sample: 2011 2014 
Included observations: 4 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 144.1003 43.59261 3.305613 0.0006 
Z -0.756590 0.390818 -1.935915 0.0025 
R-squared 0.652039     Mean dependent var 59.75000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.478058     S.D. dependent var 3.774917 
S.E. of regression 2.727209     Akaike info criterion 5.151288 
Sum squared resid 14.87534     Schwarz criterion 4.844435 
Log likelihood -8.302575     F-statistic 3.747768 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.142727     Prob(F-statistic) 0.002511 
 
Table 4.9(a): Regression results on effect of price regulation on HHI before regulation, equation (i) 
Dependent Variable: H 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/24/15   Time: 15:57 
Sample: 2004 2010 
Included observations: 7 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 2973.062 13.13586 2.263318 0.0030 
Z -18.81520 1.468984 -0.1280831 0.0064 
R-squared 0.247048 Mean dependent var 1297.676 
Adjusted R-squared 0.096458 S.D. dependent var 335.4387 
S.E. of regression 318.8507 Akaike info criterion 14.60228 
Sum squared resid 508328.9 Schwarz criterion 14.58683 
Log likelihood -49.10798 F-statistic 1.640529 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.633527 Prob(F-statistic) 0.006444 
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Table 4.9(b): Regression results on effect of price regulation on HHI after regulation, equation (ii) 
Dependent Variable: H 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/24/15   Time: 15:58 
Sample: 2011 2014 
Included observations: 4 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -4263.836 2.321925 -0.183633 0.0007 
Z 49.83398 2.081659 0.239395 0.0090 
R-squared 0.741302     Mean dependent var 1292.030 
Adjusted R-squared 0.611953     S.D. dependent var 233.1909 
S.E. of regression 145.2626     Akaike info criterion 13.10182 
Sum squared resid 42202.45     Schwarz criterion 12.79496 
Log likelihood -24.20363     F-statistic 0.731022 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.377016     Prob(F-statistic) 0.009011 
 
4.5 Discussions 
The analysis was focused on measures of competition and entry and exit of firms. The outcome of the variables 
differed based on the unit of analysis:  (i) Entry and exit (net number of firms) and (ii) measures of 
concentration (HHI-index). 
The results presented in table 4.8(a) and 4.8(b) showed that test statistics were satisfactory. P values of less than 
0.05 means we do reject the null hypothesis Prices is an important determinant of entry and exit of firms hence a 
reliable test. The goodness-of-fit variable (R2) show that the exogenous variables account for 7.4 % in the short 
panel and accounts for 65% of the variations in the long panel. Coefficient was in the short panel and negative in 
the long panel but the size increased after introduction of the policy, meaning there is an indirect relationship 
between independent and dependent variable. Price Regulation has an indirect relationship with market entry 
and exit of firms in a market. The DW statistic is approximately 2.0 and larger than R2, implying that the 
regression is not spurious.  
Comparing the intercepts in the two periods it could be argued that perception of market by entrants is more 
pessimistic in period 2 than 1, meaning confidence by the firms in the market has eroded as skepticism is 
increased. This answers objective two and three of the study. 
The results presented in table 4.9(a) and 4.9(b). The test statistics are satisfactory. P value of less than 0.05 
means we do reject the null hypothesis at 5% level of significance, thus price is an important determinant of 
market concentration giving a reliable test. The goodness-of-fit variable (R2) show that the exogenous variables 
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accounted for 24.7% before regulation and increased to 74.1% after regulation of the variations in HHI are 
explained by prices a good fit. The Coefficient sign had a negative sign before regulation an inverse relationship 
which changed after introduction of regulation to positive meaning there is a direct relationship between 
independent and dependent variable. From this results it’s an indication that Regulation has a direct relationship 
on market concentration. The DW statistic is approximately 2.0 and larger than R2, implying that the regression 
is not spurious. Comparing the coefficients in the two periods of -18.81520 and 49.83398 which measures the 
rate of competition in the market shows that HHI had gone up in period two. A unit increase in price positively 
changes market concentration by 49 units. This indicated that the market has been characterized by low 
completion after the introduction of price regulation. This is an indication that price regulation has reduced 
competition and majority of the companies are exiting the oil businesses to more profitable ventures or they 
could have resorted to other products. The estimates support the theory predictions that regulated markets 
became relatively less competitive and more crowded after 2010. Therefore above relationship answered 
objective one of the study. 
Due to lack of data it was not able to measure the impact of price regulation on product differentiation in the 
market. The estimates support the theory predictions that regulated markets became relatively less competitive 
and more crowded after 2010. 
5. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the findings for chapter five, conclusions, recommendations and suggestion for further 
studies based on the objectives of the study. The results were based on the objective of the study where the 
researcher intended to establish the implications of price regulation on market structure of oil marketing firms in 
Kenya. 
5.2: Summary of the findings 
This study was undertaken with the main objective of determining whether there is any effect of price regulation 
in the market structure of Oil Marketing Companies in Kenya. Oil is an important variable that drives the 
economies of all countries in the world .Its price fluctuations and instability often affects the efficiency of the 
propelling economy. 
The analysis here revealed that for the period under study the magnitude of price changes were higher than 
before the policy change .However the variables mainly moved in the same direction year to year. Regression 
analysis revealed that 60.6% of variation in market concentration is explained by price regulation and 65.2% of 
variation in entry and exit of firms is explained by price regulation. This finding conforms to [8] study, who 
studied the effect of price regulations on the organization and performance of gasoline market in Quebec and 
other parts of Canada. The goal of the research was to demonstrate that price regulations can have important 
unintended consequences on prices and productivity in the longer run by distorting the structure of markets. 
They argued in particular that price control policies crowded markets hence creating an endogenous barrier to 
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entry for low-cost retailers. 
The evidence here indicates that the independents variables have statistical significant impact on market 
concentration of Oil marketing industry and number of firms. It is evident that price regulation have a negative 
impact on the performance of the industry which conforms to findings in other countries that import oil. This is 
in conformity with previous findings by George Stigler who demonstrated that economic regulation often 
advances private interest such as increasing the profits of the industry being regulated. The implication is that 
regulation promotes industry profit rather than social welfare. The imposition of binding price ceiling reduces 
social welfare by   decreasing the amount exchanged in the market. The results reveal that limiting sales growth 
through price regulation will have a negative effect on the growth of industry firms 
The positive impact of price regulation on market concentration and growth of firms is consistent with some 
prior research and inconsistent with other research that found that price regulation, by itself may result in 
efficiency losses and only when coupled with an independent regulator does it improve performance. In this 
study, price regulation was found to reduce competition irrespective of whether it was coupled with an 
independent regulator. 
Competition is strongly related with growth of firms. This study found significant impacts of competition; these 
findings reject the existence of strong competition in the Oil Marketing Industry in Kenya.  Since Competition 
seems to be having a positive impact on sector performance and from a policy perspective, it is correct for 
policymakers to continue to open these markets to competition. 
5.3 Conclusion 
This paper applied a dynamic entry and price competition model applied to empirically examine the impact of 
price regulation has had on the Kenya Oil Marketing Industry during the 2004-2014 time period. Consistent 
with prior findings, the study found that the existence of an independent regulator is associated with challenges. 
The existence of an independent regulator does not necessarily imply a tightening or a loosening of regulation 
imposed on carriers. Rather, the existence of an independent regulator can be interpreted as reducing 
discretionary actions on the part of regulators, which reduces uncertainty which in turn, increases obstacles to 
sector investment. 
Price Regulation is found to be positively and significantly associated with market concentration and negatively 
associated to no of firms. This is consistent with some prior research while, which found that privatization by 
itself, may lead to decreases in sector performance. This study found that price cap regulation is associated with 
high market concentration 
5.4: Recommendations 
The aim of this study was to look into the implications of price regulation on market structure of oil marketing 
firms in Kenya. The study therefore made the following recommendations, The Ministry of Energy controls key 
sector players in the supply chain of Kenya and regulatory institutions, as such, ERC and OMCs should consult 
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further to improve suitability and applicability of ERC formula in order to protect the profitability of the sector. 
The formula has been criticized as not capturing all elements of supply chain such as financing costs for 
imports, depot costs and demurrage. 
Oil marketing firms should focus more on innovation, quality of products, as well as superior customer service 
in order to compete in the market. A marketing strategy that focuses on building better customer relationships 
would provide a better avenue for oil firms to compete. The study showed that oil marketers should move to 
reduce operational costs so as to increase their operating profits. The companies should strive to operate 
efficiently by minimizing their operating expenditures so as to increase their profitability. 
The companies should use derivatives to cushion themselves against rising international oil prices as this 
constitutes a large proportion of their direct costs. Other firms which are at the risk of being regulated in terms 
of price caps should take lessons from the oil marketing firms and focus on other marketing strategies that can 
enhance their competiveness in the market and not just focus on pricing.  
Market research will indicate the demand for added services. Firms should conduct more research in their 
business areas. This will act as a two way benefit as site specific demands will be gathered and the awareness 
and support of their businesses will become more noticeable in their direct areas. This will also help to come 
with new products that will help them diversify and have more earnings 
5.5 Opportunity for further research 
In the process of understanding more on this factor impediments further research needs to be done on the 
implications of price controls on innovation in the industry. 
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